there is an income transfer (with E,,,t(a) = 0) such that f is a Walrasian equilibrium relative to the transfer t.
It is important to the story that the transfers be income transfers rather than goods transfers. If it were possible for the government to order the goods transfers needed to achieve the desired optimum, then there would be no need for a market; the fact that allowing the market to open would not destroy the outcome does not seem to us a compelling justification for having markets. Furthermore, income transfers can be computed with significantly less information than goods transfers. In order to determine which goods transfer to order, the government would need to be able to compute a Pareto optimal allocation, which in turn would require knowledge of all agents' preferences and significant computing power. By contrast, the government may find an acceptable income transfer with no knowledge of the preferences. It may simply designate a particular income transfer which produces a final income distribution that it finds acceptable. Alternatively, it may use a process of trial and error: an income transfer is announced, markets are allowed to operate, and the resulting Walrasian equilibrium can then be observed. If that equilibrium outcome is not acceptable according to the equity criteria of the government, say because some individuals are starving or homeless, then the income transfer can be revised until the observed market outcome is acceptable.
Several caveats are required, even in the convex case. First, the above story assumes that the operations of the market produce Walrasian equilibria as outcomes; this may not be the case if there are large agents, who have incentives not to act as price-takers. Second, a problem arises if Walrasian equilibrium is not unique. If the government is restricted to redistributing income, the income redistribution that makes f a Walrasian equilibrium might also make some f ' # f Walrasian; f ' could be much more favorable to some individuals, and less favorable to others, than f. Of course, if f is Pareto optimal, then under standard assumptions, it will be the unique Walrasian equilibrium for the economy with f as the endowment map. However, as we noted in the last paragraph, it is important to the story that the transfers be of income, not goods. Thrd, the government might choose not to respect the preferences of individuals. For example, the government cannot provide an income transfer directly to young children; the transfer would have to be made to the parents of the children, and there may be a conflict between the interests of the chldren and the preferences of the parents. For t h s reason, the government might choose to provide certain specific goods to families with young chldren, rather than providing an income transfer to those families. Fourth, Walrasian equilibria need not be Pareto optimal if externalities are present or if markets are incomplete; in either case, government intervention may be Pareto improving. Finally, the income transfers discussed here are implicitly assumed to be lump sum taxes or subsidies. These transfers are based on the endowments of agents, which are difficult to observe, rather than on the trades agents make. By contrast, income taxes actually in use are based on the wage income actually earned by an individual, not on the wage income the individual could potentially earn; in other words, the tax is imposed based on the value of labor the individual chooses to sell, not on the value of the individual's labor endowment. Thus, a comparison of the welfare properties of income transfers versus various forms of nonmarket intervention should be made in the context of the incentive effects of the different schemes, in the spirit of the optimal taxation literature. Thus, even in the convex case, there are many reasons to be cautious about interpreting the second welfare theorem as justification for any policy prescription; however, so that we may focus on the situation in the nonconvex case, we shall not pursue these difficulties here. Farrell (1959) gave an early discussion of welfare theory in large economies with nonconvexities. Hildenbrand (1969) showed that the Second Welfare Theorem holds without convexity in economies with a measure space of agents. The first rigorous work on asymptotic versions of the Second Welfare Theorem for large finite economies with nonconvexities was done by Khan and Rashid (1975) , using Nonstandard Analysis. Mas-Cole11 (1985) , Proposition 4.5.1, has proved an elementary version of the Second Welfare Theorem. He used the Shapley-Folkman Theorem (Starr (1969) ) to show that any Pareto optimal allocation f can be approximately supported in the following sense: there is a price vector p such that any x > a f ( a ) satisfies p .x is nearly as great as, or greater than, p .f (a).
However, there is no reason to think that f ( a ) is close to a's demand set. Indeed, the Appendix (which is written jointly with Andreu Mas-Colell) gives an example of a sequence of exchange economies with the number of agents going to infinity and a sequence of Pareto optimal allocations in which every agent is far from her demand correspondence for every income transfer.
The form of decentralization gven in Mas-Colell's Theorem is not sufficient to justify the interpretation of the Second Welfare Theorem discussed above. Let us suppose the government has carried out the transfers needed to make f ( a ) lie on the frontier of a's budget set, with respect to the price p. We note first that there is no guarantee that there will be any price q that clears the markets, since preferences are nonconvex; we are forced to consider prices that approximately clear the markets. Worse still, since f ( a ) is not near a's demand set with respect to the price p, there is no reason to think that p will approximately clear the markets. Rather, as shown in Figure 1 ,it is possible to have a Pareto optimum f so that the local supporting price p at f is not an equilibrium price, since agent 1's demand will be at the point x, while 11's demand will be at the point y. If one makes the income transfer necessary to make f affordable for each agent at the price p, there will be a unique equilibrium price q which yields an allocation g far from f and such that the utility levels of agents at g are very different from the levels at f . Indeed, there is no income transfer t such that there is a Walrasian equilibrium relative to t which yields utility levels close to those of f to both agents. Considering approximate Walrasian equilibria does not help either, since either agent I's demand will be near x or 11's demand will be near y, or both, so per capita excess demand is not small. In other words, the government cannot even achieve the desired utility levels of the agents through income transfers and a market mechanism. If one allows the government to dictate commodity transfers rather than income transfers, the government could specify f as the initial endowment: in that case, there is no Walrasian equilibrium, nor even a price that makes per capita excess demand relatively small. Of course, if there were an approximate Walrasian allocation g, it would have the property that f ( a ) F .g(a) for all a (observe that f ( a ) is in the budget set). However, as in the convex case, allowing the government to dictate f as the initial allocation destroys the interpretation of the Second Welfare Theorem as a story of decentralized allocation.
In Theorem 3.3, we show that the government can achieve the utility levels desired for all but k agents, where k is the dimension of the commodity space. In other words, the pathology illustrated in Figure 1 disappears (at least for most agents) provided that the number of agents is large relative to the number of commodities. The proof is elementary, relying primarily on the Shapley-Folkman Theorem. We focus on a particular choice of decentralizing price p; this price is used by Mas-Cole11 in the proof of his theorem, and is closely related to the so-called gap-minimizing price studied in Anderson (1987) ; essentially, j is the price which minimizes the measure by which support fails in Mas-Colell's Theorem. Given any Pareto optimum f, there is an income transfer t and a quasiequilibrium f with respect to t such that all but k agents are indifferent between f and f: If preferences are monotone and a mild assumption on the distribution of goods at f is satisfied, then we may show that ji is strictly positive, and hence f" is a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to t . As an alternative, we can achieve an approximate equilibrium (i.e., total excess demand is bounded, independent of the number of agents) f such that all agents are indifferent between f and f: It is worth emphasizing that Theorem 3.3 is a universal theorem, applying to all exchange economics, rather than a generic theorem. However, there is no guarantee that f(a) is close to f ( a ) for any a. A result for the core analogous to Theorem 3.3 is given as Proposition 3.5 of Anderson (1986) .
In Theorem 4.1, we show that, for most large exchange economies, all Pareto optima satisfying certain bounds are close in the commodity space to Walrasian equilibria with income transfers. Specifically, we assume that we are given a distribution p of agents' preferences. We think of this as being the distribution of preferences of all possible people. We then form a sequence of exchange economies E,, with A , as the set of agents; this construction is due to Hildenbrand (1974, page 138) . Agents' endowments are assigned in an arbitrary way; their preferences are assigned by sampling from the given distribution. We show that, with probability one, the following conclusion holds: If fn(a) is a sequence of Pareto optimal allocations, bounded in an appropriate sense, there is a sequence of income transfers and Walrasian equilibria (x,p,,) relative to those transfers such that Ifn(a) -i ( a ) l converges to 0; the sense of convergence is either convergence in measure or mean, depending on the sense in which the sequence of Pareto optima is bounded.
The methodology used in proving Theorem 4.1 is similar to that used in Anderson (1985) to prove a convergence theorem for the core in exchange economies with nonconvex preferences. We are grateful to Andreu Mas-Cole11 for suggesting that we apply that methodology to the set of Pareto optimal allocations. The proof uses Nonstandard Analysis (Robinson (1970) ). A general meta-theorem guarantees that a standard proof also exists, but it could be quite difficult to write it out. We do not know of a tractable standard proof of the result. Indeed, the general case of the result in Anderson (1985) has stubbornly resisted the author's attempts to give a reasonable standard proof. Converting the proof of Theorem 4.1 to a standard proof poses additional problems not present in Anderson (1985) . Specifically, the theorem says that, for a set of sequences of economies having probability one, the result applies to every Pareto optimal allocation satisfying certain bounds. Proving this requires interchanging the order of two quantifiers. Since there are an uncountable number of Pareto optima in each economy, there is no obvious way to interchange the quantifiers using standard measure-theoretic techniques. From the structure of the nonstandard proof, it appears that the best hope for obtaining a reasonable standard proof would be to consider finite sets of candidate supporting prices which fill out the price simplex as the number of agents grows.
One might suppose that Theorem 4.1 could be deduced from Anderson (1985) , using the fact that any Pareto optimal allocation f is in the core of the economy with f as the endowment map. However, the result in Anderson (1985) applies only to economies in which the endowment maps are obtained by sampling from a distribution. Such economies have special properties. Our theorem applies to all Pareto optima within certain bounds; for many of them, the economies resulting from taking the optima as the new endowments do not satisfy the special properties. Nor does it appear possible to deduce the result in Anderson (1985) from Theorem 4.1. Any core allocation is Pareto optimal, so Theorem 4.1 tells us that core allocations are near demand sets after income transfers. However, Anderson (1985) demonstrates that core allocations are near demand sets without income transfers.
As a corollary of the nonstandard proof, we are also able (in Theorem 4.4) to prove a version of the second welfare theorem for type sequences of exchange economies.
PRELIMINARIES
We begin with some notation and definitions whlch will be used throughout. Suppose x, y E R k, B c R k. X I denotes the ith component of x; x y means x' > y' for all i; x > y means x > y and x # y; x > > y means x' > y' for all i ; x + is defined by ( x + ) ' = max{xl,O); x -= x + -x; xEly = Cf=,(xly'l; Ilxll, = maxl,,Gklx'l; ~lxll,=(Zf=~lx'l')'/'; Rk,= { X E Rk: ~2 0 ) ;
A preference is a binary relation > on R k, satisfying the following conditions:
(i) weak monotonicity: x >> y =, x + y; and (ii) free disposal: x > > y, y > z = , x > z. Let P' denote the set of preferences. A preference > is said to be (iii) An exchange economy is a map E: A + P X Rk,, where A is a finite set. For a E A, let > a denote the preference of a (i.e. the projection of &(a) onto P ) and e ( a ) the initial endowment of a (i.e. the projection of &(a) onto Rk,). An allocation is a map f : A + Rk, such that Z,,, f ( a ) = Z,, ,e(a). Given an allocation f , we define M,=max{~~Cf=~f(a,)ll,: al, ..., a k are distinct elements of A). Note that in the last definition, k is the dimension of the commodity space Rk,. An allocation f is said to be Pareto optimal if there does not exist an allocation g such that g(a) + , f ( a ) for alla E A. Let Y ( E ) denote the set of all Pareto optimal allocations for the economy E. Observe that Y ( E ) depends only on the preferences and the social endowment C,,,e(a), not on the individual endowments.
A price p is an element of R k, with 11 pII1 = 1. A denotes the set of prices, AO= { p E A: p >> 0). The demand set for ( > , e), with income augmented by rE02 is D ( p , ( + , e ) , r ) = { x~R k , : p . x < p . e + r , y + x = , p . y > p . e + r ) . D ( p , ( > , e), r ) could be empty under the hypotheses we have placed on preferences. An income transfer is a function t: A + R with C,, ,[(a) < 0. By abuse of notation, we let D(p, a, t) = D ( p , ( + , . e(a)), t(a)) if a E A.
The quasidemand set for ( + , e), with income augmented by r E R is Q ( p , ( > , e ) , r ) = { x € R k , : p S x < p . e + r , y + x = , p . y > p . e + r ) .
Q ( p , ( > , e), r ) could be empty under the hypotheses we have placed on preferences. By abuse of notation, we let Q(p, a , t ) = Q ( p , ( > ., e(a)), t(a)) if a E A .
A Walrasian equilibrium for E, relative to the income transfer t, is a pair ( f , p), where C, , , f ( a ) <C,,,e(a), p € A , and f ( a ) E D ( p , a, t ) for all a € A .
Let W(E, t) denote the set of Walrasian equilibria for E, relative to the income transfer t. A Walrasian quasiequilibrium for E, relative to the income transfer t, is a pair (f, a),whereC,,,f(a) g C a E A e ( a ) , p E A and f ( a ) E Q(p, a, t) for all a €A. Let 2 (~, t ) denote the set of Walrasian quasiequilibria for E, relative to the income transfer t.
Given x E I F%: , and % is the subset of 9 consisting of sequences of assignments in which the largest bundle given to any agent becomes small in relation to the size of the economy. Define % is the subset of 9 consisting of assignments which are uniformly integrable; the economic interpretation is that no group consisting of a small proportion of the agents can possess a significant quantity, per capita, of the goods. Observe that 42 c %.
TWO CONSEQUENCES OF THE SHAPLEY-FOLKMAN THEOREM
In Proposition 4.5.1, Mas-Cole11 (1985) gave an elementary version of the Second Welfare Theorem, using the Shapley-Folkman Theorem (Starr (1969) ). We shall use Mas-Colell's theorem as the first step in the proof of our results.
Since our normalization of prices differs from his, and our assumptions on preferences are a little weaker, we shall give a proof. THEOREM 3.1 (Compare Mas-Colell (1985) , Proposition 4.5.1): Let e: A -,P ' X R k, be an exchange economy. If f E 9(e), there exists p E A such that C a E A 9 ) (~, f , a) < PROOF: Suppose f E 9(e). Let y(a) = { y -f (a): y > , f (a)) and r = C, , ,y(a). Suppose there exists G E r with G < < 0. Then there exists g:
+C,,,f(a)-C,,AG/IAI =G+C,,Ae(a)-G= C,, ,e(a), whch contradicts the Pareto optimality of f. Hence G < < 0 =, G G T.
Suppose x E con T. By the Shapley-Folkman Theorem (Starr (1969) ), we can write x in the form x = Z, , ,g(a), where g(a) E con y(a) for all a E A and g ( a ) E y(a) for all but m agents a, for some m < k. Let those agents be a,, . . ., a,. Let g"(ai)= (6,. ..,6) for some 6 > 0 and g(a) = g(a) for a E { a l,..., a,). Since y(a,)> -f(ai),cony(a,) -!(a,).
Let z = -(Mf ,..., Mf).
a). Since g(a) E y(a) for all
a E A, C,, ,g(a) E r , and hence we cannot have x < < z -m(6,. ..,a). Since 6 is arbitrary, we cannot have x < < z.
Hence, con r does not intersect { w E R k : w < < z ) . Therefore, there exists P E A with i n f p . r > s u p p . { w : w<<z)= -Mf. Therefore, C,,,q(p, f , a )
REMARK 3.2: For certain applications, it may be useful to use a different normalization of prices. If (l/r) + (l/s) = 1 (with the usual convention that l/oo = O), and prices are normalized so that 11 pll ,= 1, then the theorem remains true with Mf = kl/'maxllCf"=, f(a,)l~,. The reader is warned that there was an error in this remark in the working paper version of this paper: the factor kl/' was omitted.
THEOREM 3.3: Suppose e: A -,P" X Rk, is an exchange economy. IffE 9(e), then there exists an income transfer f" with -2Mf < C,, ,t"(a) < 0 and (f:p) E 2(e, f") such that, for all but k agents a E A, f ( a ) -a &). Alternatiuely, we may jind an income transfer i with -Mf < 1,.,?(a) < 0 and f i a ) E Q(F, a, i ) such that, for all a E A, f ( a ) -, h a ) and
If in addition we assume that > a E P n P " for all a and (ii) Since preferences may be nonconvex, W(E,1 ) may be empty. The conclusion that it is not empty is less surprising than it might at first appear. Since we only require that C,,,f"(a) < C, , ,@(a), and we may have C,, ,t"(a) < 0, the government ends up with some quantity of goods. It is as if the government had a linear preference relation with indifference curves perpendicular to p ; this provides the necessary freedop to obtain awalrasian equilibrium. (iii) The alternative formulation involving f is a notion of approximate Walrasian equilibrium. The theorem indicates that the market value of the absolute value (taken componentwise) of the excess demand is bounded. This result is obtained essentially by combining the formulation involving f with the argument in Anderson (1982a) . (iv) Note that the statement of the Second Welfare Theorem in Debreu (1959) involves the notion of equilibrium relative to a price system. An equilibrium relative to a price system is immediately seen to be a Walrasian equilibrium after income transfers in the sense that we use here. Under smoothness assumptions, the bound in Theorem 3.1 can be improved to order l/n, where n is the number of agents (Mas-Cole11 (1985, Proposition 4.5.9) ). This results in an improvement in the bound on C, , ,?(a) in Theorem 3.3, but appears not to improve the other bounds. (vi) It is possible to give a sequential formulation in which p is bounded away from the boundary of the price simplex; it then follows that LEMMA 3.5: Suppose + satisjies free disposal. If x E W k,, then con { z: z r x ) is closed.
PROOF: Let B = {z: z + x ) . If E 3 and w >y, then we may find wm-+ w and ym? y such that wm> >ym and y m k X. By free disposal, wm + x, so w E 3.
Thus, B + R k,c3 c W k,. Hence, con B is closed (Mas-Cole11 (1985) , p. 27, F.1.2).
PROOFOF THEOREM 3.3: By Theorem 3.1, there exist p E A such that inf p . r 2 -M,. If p E A, then inf p .r G 0. Hence, a = -supp A inf p . r exists. Suppose p, is such that inf p, .r -+ -a. By taking a convergent subsequence, we may assume that p, -+ p for some p E A. Then -a >, inf j. on the other hand, if i n f p . r < -a , then there exists G E T and S > O such that j . G < -a -a , < inf p, .I' -S/2 (for n sufficiently large) <p, . G -S/2, a contradiction since p, -p. Hence, inf p . r = -a. The price p is used in the proof of Mas-Cole11 (1985) , Proposition 4.5.1. We call p the gap-minimizing price because it mini-mizes the "decentralization gap" for the Pareto optimum f ; see Mas-Cole11 (1985) (Proposition 7.4.1) and Anderson (1987) for a related construction for core allocations.
Let z = ( -a , .. . , -a). We claim that z E con if not, there exists q # 0, q .z < inf q . con r.Observe that for any i and any t > 0, (0,. . . ,0, t, 0,. . . ,0) E r, where the t occurs in the ith place, by weak monotonicity. Hence, if qi < 0 for -some i, inf q .con r = -oo, a contradiction. Hence, q > 0, so we may assume 
C f l u ) G C ( g ( a ) + f ( a ) ) C ( g ( a ) + f ( a ) )
a s A a e ( a l ,..., a,,,) e ( a ) ) . 
RANDOM SEQUENCES OF ECONOMIES
The purpose of this section is to show that a version of the Second Welfare Theorem stronger than the results of Section 3 holds for almost all sequences of economies drawn at random: agents' consumptions are close to their consumptions at a Walrasian equilibrium with income transfers. The key observation in the proof is that sequences of economies drawn at random from a given distribution of agents' characteristics converge in a stronger sense than weak convergence. The proof is modelled after the proof of a stronger core convergence theorem with nonconvex preferences in Anderson (1985) . As a corollary of the proof, we also prove a theorem (Theorem 4.4) for type sequences of exchange economies.
P call be made into a Borel subset of a compact metrizable space (Hildenbrand (1974 ), Grodal (1974 ); the topology this metric generates is called the topology of closed convergence. Let A be the space of Borel probability measures p on P.
Suppose p € A .We may think of p as describing the underlying distribution of preferences of "all possible people," and construct sequences of finite economies by sampling from p. Specifically, we take fi to be the countable product P", with the countable product measure pN. Any o E fi is a sequence { w,, a,, . . . ) oiE P, of preferences. Let A, = {I,. . . , n ). Given such an o and an arbitrary sequences of endowment maps en: A, -+ Rk,, we form a sequence of economies E:: A, -+ P X Rk,, where e;(i) = (wi, c,(i)). In other words, E; is the economy whose agents have characteristics (o,, en@)), . . . , (on, e,(n)). The construction of a sequence of economies by sampling in this way is due to Hildenbrand (1974, p. 138 (iv) in Remark 3.4 apply here also. In addition, note that our assumptions on preferences are not sufficient to guarantee that demand sets are not empty. However, one consequence of 'Theorem 4.1 is that the existence of Pareto optima implies that demand sets are nonempty.
We shall first prove the following result for nonstandard exchange economies, which were introduced by Brown and Robinson (1975) . (Loeb (1975) ).
(iii) a € A I { a € A : > -, E B ) /
The induced measure v (B ) = on *P is standard [v IAl distributed (see Section 8 of Anderson (1982b) IAl a E A IAI a E A PROOF: Let y(B) = L(v)(st-'(B)) for Bore1 B c P. By Anderson (1982b, Proposition 8.4 (ii)), p is a Radon Probability measure. In particular, + a is near-standard for p-almost all a.
Given p E AO and E , 6 E R + +, define
Sincep>>O, x~D ( p , ( + , x ) ) i f~= O . I f x # O , y > x , a n d p . y = p . x , t h e n w e can find y' arbitrarily close to y with p .y' < p . x. Since > is continuous, we can choose such a y' satisfying y' + x, contradicting (*). Hence, q ( p , x, >) = 0 ( > ,x) ). Now, let x vary, subject to the constraint llxllrn Q I/E.We claim that there exists 6 such that > E BP,,. If not, then we may find a sequence x, with q ( p , x,, >) -+ 0 but p(x,, D ( p , ( > , y))) > E for every y. By taking a convergent subsequence, we may assume without loss of generality that x, + x for some x. q ( p , x, >) = 0, and so x E D ( p , ( > , x) ). Letting y = x, we arrive at a contradiction. Thus, for fixed p E A" and E E R ++, Since y is countably additive, given E E R ++, there exists 6 E R ++ such that
Suppose f E *P(E). Transferring Theorem 3.1, we see that there exists p E *A such that
We show "p >> 0. If not, we can assume without loss of generality that Opl > 0,
= 0. L(A)({a: q ( p , f, a ) = 0, > a near-standard, "f ( a ) < < co)) = 1. By assumption (ii), we can find a such that q ( p , f , a ) = 0, > .i s near standard, "f ( a ) co, and "( f (a)') > 0. Let yE*Rk+, "y="f(a)+ (O,l,O ,. ..,O), so "y0>,Of(a). Hence, y > , f ( a ) . But a contradiction. Thus, "p > > 0.
Thus, given E E R ++, we may find 6 E R ,
Hence, A({a E A: rp("p, f , a ) < 6)) = 1 for 6 E R++. Hence there is some 8 = 0 such that X({a E A: q(Op, f , a ) < 8)) = 1. For all E E R ++, v(*BOpe8) > 1-2~.
Hence, there is some E = 0 such that v(Bopz8) > 1-2E = 1.
For L(h)-almost all a E A, the following conditions hold: (i) rp("p, f , a ) < 8, (ii) + a E BOpz8, and (iii) 11 f (a)llm 1 , ' : . < For such a 's, there exists y such that each t E T, and C(, ,. ,,Te>> 0. Then for sufJicientEy large n, there exist income tran~fers t, with Z, , Ant,(a)< 0 and ( L , p,) E %'"(en, t,) such that, for all 6 > 0, Furthermore, if the sequence { f, ) E %, then we may choose t, and K such that PROOFOF THEOREM 4.4: Consider the nonstandard extension of the sequences A,, f,, etc. and choose n E *N -N. We shall apply Theorem 4.3 to the economy E,. Assumptions (i)-(iii) of Theorem 4.3 follow from the corresponding assumptions in Theorem 4.4. Assumption (iv) follows from the fact that the sequence is a type sequence (Anderson (1982b, Example 8.2) ). Hence, there is an internal income transfer t,, and (X, p,) E *W(E,,, t,) such that L ( a ) =f,(a) for L(X)-almost all a E A,. Hence,
Hence, there exists E E N such that, for n > E, we may find t,, and ( A , p,,) E %"-(en, t,) such that 1 { a A , I ) -
If the sequence fn is uniformly integrable, then for infinite n, f, is S-integrable (Anderson (1982b, Theorem 6.5 n E N and some 17 
Now suppose in addition that
is uniformly integrable. Since 11 f n ( a ) -L ( a ) l l converges to 0 in measure and is uniformly integrable, it converges to 0 in mean, i.e.
Then
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SECOND WELFARE THEOREM

APPENDIX
If preferences are strongly convex, then core allocations of large finite economies are close to demand sets for some price (Debreu and Scarf (1963) , Kannai (1970) , Bewley (1973) , Grodal and Hildenbrand (1973) -published as Theorem 1 on page 179 of Hildenbrand (1974 )-and Anderson (1981 ). The Second Welfare Theorem asserts that the same is true of Pareto Optimal allocations under some redistribution of the initial endowments; indeed, no approximation is needed. Both Theorems hold with nonconvex preferences in nonatomic exchange economies (Aumann (1964 ), Hildenbrand (1969 ).
Positive results on the Second Welfare Theorem with nonconvex preferences are given in the body of this paper, and in the other papers discussed there. Positive results on core convergence with nonconvex preferences are discussed in Anderson (1985) . Using the Shapley-Folkman Theorem, one can show that a weaker form of decentralization holds for the core (Anderson (1978) ; see also Dierker (1975) , Brown and Robinson (1974) , Khan (1974) , and Grodal and Hildenbrand (1973) -published as Theorem 3 on page 202 of Hildenbrand (1974) ). Anderson (1985) gives a result for the core analogous to Theorem 4.1 in the present paper: with probability one in a certain formulation of random economies, all core allocations are close to demand sets. Alternatively, one can combine Mas-Cole11 and Neuefeind (1977) with Proposition 4 on page 200 and condition (*) on page 201 of Hildenbrand (1974) , to show that any purely competitive sequence of economies with limit in a residual class has its core allocations close to demand sets. Finally, Anderson (1986) gives a result analogous to Theorem 3.3 of the present paper: given a core allocation, one can find small income transfers and a Walrasian equilibrium relative to those transfers such that most agents are indifferent between their consumptions at the core allocation and the Walrasian equilibrium.
The purpose of this Appendix is to show that neither the probability one result for the Second Welfare Theorem (Theorem 4.1 of the present paper) nor the probability one result for core convergence (Theorem 3.1 of Anderson (1985) ) nor the residual result for core convergence (combining Mas-Cole11 and Neuefeind (1977) with Proposition 4 on page 200 and condition (*) on page 201 of Hildenbrand (1974) ) can be strengthened to hold for aN sequences of economies. Cheng (1983) has previously given an example of a sequence of economies in which one agent's consumption remains a bounded distance away from his/her budget set and thus, afortiori, a bounded distance from his/her demand set; thus, the convergence of the competitive gap to 0 is not uniform over agents. In our example, we construct a sequence of economies, each with a unique core allocation; the consumption of every consumer at these core allocations stays a bounded distance away from the consumer's demand correspondence. Furthermore, this remains true even after redistribution of endowments.
In the example, there are two commodities. All n agents in the nth economy have the same homothetic preference relation. The initial endowment is in the core, and hence Pareto optimal. The sequence of economies is purely competitive in the sense of Hildenbrand (1974) ; the limit of the sequence is a continuum economy in which all agents are identical, with homothetic preferences, and in whlch the initial endowment is a Walrasian allocation. Moreover, the sequence of supports of the distributions of agents' characteristics converges to the (one-point) support of the limit economy. The preferences are of class c2(Mas-Cole11 (1985, Definition 2.3.4) ). The preferences converge to the preference in the limit economy in the topology of c2 uiiform convergence on compacta (see Mas-Colell (1985, Definition 2.4 .1 on page 70)). In the relevant neighborhoods, they have nonvanishing Gaussian curvature.
The preference in the limit economy has a tripleton demand, which is nongeneric for homothetic preferences and two commodities. However, the use of homothetic preferences is not essential. Furthermore, one could modify the example so that, in each economy, there are two distinct preferences, each of which has doubleton demands.
We now turn to the example. Throughout, we shall use the notation and definitions of Section 2 of Anderson (1985) and the body of the present paper.
Fix ( ,1) , p . x < 1.05) is the union of three convex sets X-,, Xro, and XI with (0.5,1.5) E X-,, ( 1 , l )E X,, and (1.5,0.5) E Xi; and so that the curved portion of the boundary of each of these three sets has curvature bounded away from 0, uniformly in n. Hence, there is a constant M E R such that the diameter of { x E X,: p .x 6 1 + 1 ) is less than or equal to MJF for each i E { -l , O , 1 and all t E [O,0.051 . We choose the indifference culve so that u, < min {1/40n, ( p , 1 2 [ 4~n 2 ). Furthermore, we can choose the indifference curve so that the preference relation is C .
The sequence E, is purely competitive in the sense of Hildenbrand (1974 + a is a homothetic preference. Also, ( e , p ) is a Walrasian equilibrium in the limit economy.
Consider the allocation f, = en. We claim f, is in the core. If not, we can find a coalition S,, c A, is in the core of E,; it then follows that f, is also Pareto optimal. To see that f, is the unique element of the core, note that any core allocation h , must satisfy h , ( a ) t.e,(a) for all a f~ A, and X,,,nh,(a) =X,,Ane,(a) . The argument just given shows that h , ( a ) =f ,(a) for all a EA,,. For any price q, and any a E A,,, the distance from f,(a) -to the demaiid set D(q,, a ) is at least 1 / a . Moreover, given any endowment transfer, the demand is never in the interior of the cone generated by the two rays ( ( t , 3 t ) : t E R, ) and ((31, t ) : t E R + ) .The minimum distance from ( 1 , l ) to these rays is m,so the distance from f,(a) to the demand correspondence (after transfers) is at least m.
